Federated learning (FL) has emerged as a prominent distributed learning paradigm. FL entails some pressing needs for developing novel parameter estimation approaches with theoretical guarantees of convergence, which are also communication efficient, differentially private and Byzantine resilient in the heterogeneous data distribution settings. Quantization-based SGD solvers have been widely adopted in FL and the recently proposed SIGNSGD with majority vote shows a promising direction. However, no existing methods enjoy all the aforementioned properties. In this paper, we propose an intuitively-simple yet theoretically-sound method based on SIGNSGD to bridge the gap. We present Stochastic-Sign SGD which utilizes novel stochastic-sign based gradient compressors enabling the aforementioned properties in a unified framework. We also present an error-feedback variant of the proposed Stochastic-Sign SGD which further improves the learning performance in FL. We test the proposed method with extensive experiments using deep neural networks on the MNIST dataset. The experimental results corroborate the effectiveness of the proposed method.
distributed SGD. Nonetheless, it has been shown in [9] that SIGNSGD fails to converge when the data on different workers are heterogeneous (i.e., drawn from different distributions), which is one of the most important features in FL.
In this work, inspired by the idea of adding carefully designed noise before taking the sign operation in [9] , we present Stochastic-Sign SGD, which is a class of stochastic-sign based SGD algorithms. In particular, we first propose a stochastic compressor sto-sign, which extends SIGNSGD to its stochastic version Sto-SIGNSGD. In this scheme, instead of directly transmitting the signs of gradients, the workers adopt a two-level stochastic quantization and transmit the signs of the quantized results. We note that different from the existing 1-bit stochastic quantization schemes (e.g., QSGD [3] , cpSGD [7] ), the proposed algorithm also uses the majority vote rule in gradient aggregation, which allows the server-to-worker communication to be 1-bit compressed and ensures robustness as well. Then, to further resolve the privacy concerns, a differentially private stochastic compressor dp-sign is proposed, which can accommodate the requirement of ( , δ)-local differential privacy [10] . The corresponding algorithm is termed as DP-SIGNSGD. We then prove that when the number of workers is large enough, both of the proposed algorithms converge with a rate of O( √ d √ T ) under heterogeneous data distribution, where d is the dimension of the hypothesis vector and T is the total number of training iterations. In addition, assuming that there are M normal (benign) workers, it is shown that the Byzantine resilience of the proposed algorithms is upper bounded by | 
m ) i is the i-th entry of worker m's gradient at iteration t and b i ≥ max m (g (t) m ) i is some design parameter. Particularly, b i depends on the data heterogeneity (through max m (g (t) m ) i ). As a special case, the proposed algorithms can tolerate M − 1 Byzantine workers when the normal workers can access the same dataset (i.e., (g (t)
j ) i , ∀1 ≤ j, m ≤ M ), which recovers the result of SIGNSGD.
We also extend the proposed algorithm to its error-feedback variant, termed as Error-Feedback Stochastic-Sign SGD. In this scheme, the server keeps track of the error induced by the majority vote operation and compensates for the error in the next communication round. Both the convergence and the Byzantine resilience are established. Extensive simulations are performed to demonstrate the effectiveness of all the proposed algorithms.
Related Works
Gradient Quantization: To accommodate the need of communication efficiency in distributed learning, various gradient compression methods have been proposed. Most of the existing works focus on unbiased methods [11, 12] . QSGD [3] , TernGrad [4] and ATOMO [13] propose to use stochastic quantization schemes, based on which a differentially private variant is proposed in [7] . Due to the unbiased nature of such quantization methods, the convergence of the corresponding algorithms can be established.
The idea of sharing the signs of gradients in SGD can be traced back to 1-bit SGD [14] . [15] and [5, 8] show theoretical and empirical evidence that sign based gradient schemes can converge well despite the biased approximation nature in the homogeneous data distribution scenario. In the heterogeneous data distribution case, [9] shows that the convergence of SIGNSGD is not guaranteed and proposes to add carefully designed noise to ensure a convergence rate of O(d 3 4 /T 1 4 ). However, their analysis assumes second order differentiability of the noise probability density function and cannot be applied to some commonly used noise distributions (e.g., uniform and Laplace distributions). In addition, their analysis requires that the variance of the noise goes to infinity as the number of iterations grows, which may be unrealistic in practice.
Error-Compensated SGD: Instead of directly using the biased approximation of the gradients, [14] corrects the quantization error by adding error feedback in subsequent updates and observes almost no accuracy loss empirically. [6] proposes the error-compensated quantized SGD in quadratic optimization and proves its convergence for unbiased stochastic quantization. [16] proves the convergence of the proposed error compensated algorithm for strongly-convex loss functions and [17] proves the convergence of sparsified gradient methods with error compensation for both convex and non-convex loss functions. In addition, [18] proposes EF-SIGNSGD, which combines the error compensation methods and SIGNSGD; however, only the single worker scenario is considered. [19] further extends it to the multi-worker scenario and the convergence is established. However, it is required in these two works that the compressing error cannot be larger than the magnitude of the original vector, which is not the case for some biased compressors like SIGNSGD. [20] considers more general compressors and proves the convergence under the assumption that the compressors have bounded magnitude of error. However, to the best our knowledge, none of the existing works consider the Byzantine resilience of the error-compensated methods.
Byzantine Tolerant SGD in Heterogenous Environment: There have been significant research interests in developing SGD based Byzantine tolerant algorithms, most of which consider homogeneous data distribution, e.g., Krum [21] , ByzantineSGD [22] , and the median based algorithms [23] . [8] shows that SIGNSGD can tolerate up to half "blind" Byzantine workers who determine how to manipulate their gradients before observing the gradients.
To accommodate the need for robust FL, some Byzantine tolerant algorithms that can deal with heterogeneous data distribution have been developed. [24] proposes to incorporate a regularized term with the objective function. However, it requires strong convexity and can only converge to the neighborhood of the optimal solution. [25] uses trimmed mean to aggregate the shared parameters. Nonetheless, it can only tolerate a small (unknown) number of Byzantine workers. In addition, both [24] and [25] assume model aggregation, i.e., both the workers and the parameter server share their models with others in full precision, which may incur significant communication cost.
Our Contributions. This paper makes three main contributions to the field of FL as follows.
1. We propose the framework of Stochastic-Sign SGD, which utilizes the stochastic-sign based gradient compressors to overcome the convergence issue of SIGNSGD in the presence of heterogeneous data distribution. In particular, two novel stochastic compressors, sto-sign and dp-sign, are proposed, which extend SIGNSGD to Sto-SIGNSGD and DP-SIGNSGD, respectively. DP-SIGNSGD is shown to improve the privacy and the accuracy simultaneously, without sacrificing any communication efficiency. We further improve the learning performance of the proposed algorithm by incorporating the error-feedback method.
2. We prove that all the algorithms converge with a rate of O( √ d √ T ) in the heterogeneous data distribution scenario, which matches SIGNSGD in the homogeneous data distribution scenario. 3. We theoretically show the Byzantine resilience of the proposed algorithms, which depends on the heterogeneity of the local datasets of the workers.
Problem Formulation
In this paper, we consider a typical federated optimization problem with M normal workers as in [1] . Formally, the goal is to minimize the finite-sum objective of the form
For a machine learning problem, we have a sample space I = X × Y , where X is a space of feature vectors and Y is a label space. Given the hypothesis space W ⊆ R d , we define a loss function l : W × I → R which measures the loss of prediction on the data point (x, y) ∈ I made with the hypothesis vector w ∈ W. In such a case, f m (w) is a local function defined by the local dataset of worker m and the hypothesis w. More specifically,
where |D m | is the size of worker m's local dataset D m .
In many FL applications, the local datasets of the workers are heterogeneously distributed. In this case, we have D m = D j and therefore ∇f m (w) = ∇f j (w), ∀m = j.
We consider a parameter server paradigm. At each communication round t, each worker m forms a batch of training samples, based on which it computes and transmits the stochastic gradient g (t)
m as an estimate to the true gradient ∇f m (w (t) m ). When the worker m evaluates the gradient over its whole local dataset, we have g
After receiving the gradients from the workers, the server performs aggregation and sends the aggregated gradient back to the workers. Finally, the workers update their local model weights using the aggregated gradient. In this sense, the classic stochastic gradient descent (SGD) algorithm [26] performs iterations of the form In addition to the M normal workers, it is assumed that there exist B Byzantine attackers, and its set is denoted as B. Instead of using sto-sign and dp-sign, the Byzantine attackers can use an arbitrary compressor denoted by byzantine-sign. In this work, we consider the scenario that the Byzantine attackers have access to the average gradients of all the M normal workers (i.e., g
m , ∀j ∈ B) and follow the same procedure as the normal workers. Therefore, we assume that the Byzantine attacker j shares the opposite signs of the true gradients, i.e., byzantine-sign(g
In order to facilitate the convergence analysis, the following commonly adopted assumptions are made. Assumption 1. (Lower bound). For all w and some constant F * , we have objective value F (w) ≥ F * . Assumption 2. (Smoothness). ∀w 1 , w 2 , we require for some non-negative constant L
where < ·, · > is the standard inner product.
Assumption 3. (Variance bound). For any worker m, the stochastic gradient oracle gives an independent unbiased estimate g m that has coordinate bounded variance:
for a vector of non-negative constantsσ = [σ 1 , · · · , σ d ]; (g m ) i and ∇f m (w) i are the i-th coordinate of the stochastic and the true gradient, respectively. Assumption 4. The total number of workers is odd.
We note that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are standard for non-convex optimization and Assumption 4 is just to ensure that there is always a winner in the majority vote [9] , which can be easily relaxed.
Experimental Settings. To facilitate empirical discussions on our proposed algorithms in the remaining sections, we first introduce our experimental settings here. We implement our proposed method with a two-layer fully connected neural network on the standard MNIST dataset [27] . We consider a scenario of M = 31 normal workers. To simulate the heterogeneous data distribution scenario, each worker only stores exclusive data for one out of the ten categories, unless otherwise noted. We use a constant learning rate and tune the parameter from the set {1, 0.1, 0.01, 0.005, 0.001, 0.0001}. More details about the implementation can be found in Section 4 of the supplementary document.
Algorithms and Convergence Analysis
In this section, we propose two compressors sto-sign and dp-sign for the Stochastic-Sign SGD framework, which can deal with the heterogeneous data distribution scenario. The basic ideas of the two compressors are given as follows.
• sto-sign: instead of directly sharing the signs of the gradients, sto-sign first performs a two-level stochastic quantization and then transmits the signs of the quantized results. • dp-sign: it is a differentially private version of sto-sign. The probability of each coordinate of the gradients mapping to {−1, 1} is designed to accommodate the local differential privacy requirements.
In this section, we first consider the scenario in which all the workers are benign. The Byzantine resilience of sto-sign and dp-sign will be discussed in Section 5. In addition, we assume that each worker evaluates the gradients over its whole local dataset for simplicity (i.e., g (t) m = ∇f m (w (t) ), ∀1 ≤ m ≤ M ). Particularly, in federated learning, the workers usually compute ∇f m (w (t) ) due to the small size of the local dataset. The discussion about stochastic gradients is presented in Section 6. The proofs of the theoretical results are provided in Section 2 of the supplementary document.
The Stochastic Compressor sto-sign
Formally, the compressor sto-sign is defined as follows.
Definition 1. For any given gradient g
m , the compressor sto-sign outputs sto-sign(g
where (g (t)
m and b, respectively.
Recall that the performance of Algorithm 1 largely depends on the probability of wrong aggregation (c.f. (4)). When q(g (t)
m ), whether (4) holds or not is determined by the gradients g m 's, which are unknown. As a result, the convergence of SIGNSGD is not guaranteed. The key idea of sto-sign is to introduce the stochasticity such that the probability of wrong aggregation can be theoretically bounded for an arbitrary realization of g (t) m 's.
In the following discussion, we term Algorithm 1 with q(g (t)
For the ease of presentation, we consider the scalar case and obtain the following results for the compressor sto-sign. They can be readily generalized to the vector case by applying the results independently on each coordinate. Theorem 1. Let u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u M be M known and fixed real numbers and consider random variableŝ
where c is some positive constant.
Given the results in Theorem 1 and Lemma 1, the proof of Theorem 2 follows the well known strategy of relating the norm of the gradient to the expected improvement of the global objective in a single iteration. Then accumulating the improvement over the iterations yields the convergence rate of the algorithm. Remark 2. Similar to SIGNSGD, the convergence rate of Sto-SIGNSGD depends on the L 1 -norm of the gradient. A detailed discussion on this feature can be found in [5] . Note that compared to the convergence rate of SIGNSGD, there is a positive coefficient c < 1. This can be understood as the cost of dealing with the heterogeneous data distribution. In addition, c decreases as the probability of wrong aggregation increases. Therefore, a suitable b that minimizes the probability of wrong aggregation helps improve the performance of Sto-SIGNSGD. 
The results are shown in Figure 1 . It can be observed that Sto-SIGNSGD outperforms SIGNSGD and the performance of "b = 0.01" is almost the same as "Optimal b". In addition, it can be observed that for fixed b, b should be large enough to optimize the performance. Then when b keeps increasing, both the training accuracy and the testing accuracy decrease, which corroborates our analysis above.
The Differentially Private Compressor dp-sign
In this subsection, we present the differentially private version of sto-sign. Formally, the compressor dp-sign is defined as follows.
Definition 2. For any given gradient g (t) m , the compressor dp-sign outputs dp-sign(g (t) m , , δ). The i-th entry of dp-sign(g (t) m , , δ) is given by
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the normalized Gaussian distribution; σ = ∆2 2 ln( 1.25 δ ), where and δ are the differential privacy parameters and ∆ 2 is the sensitivity measure. 2 Theorem 3. The proposed compressor dp-sign(·, , δ) is ( , δ)-differentially private for any , δ ∈ (0, 1).
Remark 3. Note that throughout this paper, we assume δ > 0. For the δ = 0 scenario, the Laplace mechanism [10] can be used by replacing the cumulative distribution function of the normalized Gaussian distribution in (10) with that of the Laplace distribution. The corresponding discussion is provided in the supplementary document.
We term Algorithm 1 with q(g (t) m ) = dp-sign(g (t) m , , δ) as DP-SIGNSGD. Similar to sto-sign, we consider the scalar case and obtain the following result for dp-sign(·, , δ). Theorem 4. Let u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u M be M known and fixed real numbers. Further define random variablesû i = dp-sign(u i , , δ), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ M . Then there always exist constants σ 0 and M 0 such that P (sign( 1
Given Theorem 4, the convergence of DP-SIGNSGD can be obtained by following a similar analysis to that of Theorem 2.
2 Please refer to Section 1 of the supplementary document for detailed information about the differential privacy parameters ( ,δ) and the sensitivity measure ∆2. Theorem 5. Suppose Assumptions 1-2 are satisfied, and set the learning rate η = 1 √ T d . Then there exists some constants σ 0 and M 0 such that when σ ≥ σ 0 and the number of workers M ≥ M 0 , by running DP-SIGNSGD for T iterations, we have
Byzantine Resilience
In this section, the Byzantine resilience of the proposed algorithms is investigated. We note that the convergence of Sto-SIGNSGD and DP-SIGNSGD is limited by the probability of wrong aggregation (i.e., more than half of the workers share the wrong signs). Let Z i denote the number of normal workers that share (quantized) gradients with different signs from the true gradient ∇F (w (t) ) on the i-th coordinate (i.e., q(g
Then, Z i is a Poisson binomial variable. In order to tolerate k i Byzantine workers on the i-th coordinate of the gradient, we need to have
where M is the number of benign workers. Therefore, we can prove the following theorem. Theorem 6. There exists a positive constant s 0 such that when s > s 0 , Sto-SIGNSGD and DP-SIGNSGD can at least tolerate k i Byzantine attackers on the i-th coordinate of the gradient and k i satisfies
Overall, the number of Byzantine workers that the algorithms can tolerate is given by min 1≤i≤d k i .
measures the probability of wrong aggregation after taking the Byzantine workers into consideration. As we know, 1 − 1 x e 1 x is an increasing function of x (and therefore s). So the second equation of (12) indicates that the Byzantine tolerance decreases as s increases, which conforms to the observation from the first equation of (12).
According to (12) , when sto-sign is used, we can set
maxm|∇fm(w (t) )i| , which means that the Byzantine resilience depends on the heterogeneity of the local datasets. When the workers can access the same dataset, i.e., ∇f m (w (t) ) i = ∇f n (w (t) ) i , ∀m, n, Theorem 6 gives x = 1 and k i < M . Therefore, it can tolerate M − 1 Byzantine workers. Remark 4. Our analysis of the convergence and the Byzantine resilience is based on each individual coordinate of the gradients, which corresponds to the generalized Byzantine attacks and the dimensional Byzantine resilience [28] . Furthermore, it also indicates that the parameter σ in dp-sign can be different across coordinates and iterations, which allows one to select suitable parameters for different coordinates and iterations to improve the privacy performance of the algorithm. A similar idea has been explored in [29] without considering quantization.
Experimental results. Fig. 2 shows the performance of Sto-SIGNSGD for different selection of b = b · 1 and different number of Byzantine workers B. It can be seen that when b = 0.001, it is not large enough to optimize the performance according to our results in Section 4. Setting b = 0.003 and b = 0.01 achieves almost the same performance as "Optimal b" when there is no Byzantine worker (B = 0). However, as the number of Byzantine workers increases, both the training and the testing accuracy of "b = 0.01" drop much faster than those of "b = 0.003", which conforms to our analysis above that a lager b results in worse Byzantine resilience.
To examine the impact of data heterogeneity, we vary the number of labels of each worker's local training dataset. Table 1 shows the testing accuracy of Sto-SIGNSGD with optimal b. It can be observed that the Byzantine resilience of Sto-SIGNSGD increases as the number of labels increases. Up to now, we examine the performance of Sto-SIGNSGD, the results for DP-SIGNSGD are deferred to Section 7. Training Accuracy 6 Extending to SGD Up until this point in the paper, the discussions are based on the assumption that each worker can evaluate its local true gradient ∇f m (w (t) ) for the ease of presentation. In the SGD scenario, we have to further account for the sampling noise. Particularly, the following theorem can be proved. 
• The mini-batch size of stochastic gradient is at least T . Remark 5. Note that the first condition is not hard to satisfy. One sufficient condition is that the sampling noise of each worker is symmetric with zero mean. This assumption is also used in [8] , which shows that the sampling noise is approximately not only symmetric, but also unimodal. Remark 6. We note that by replacing the compressor sign in SIGNSGD with sto-sign or dp-sign, we can obtain the improved rate (a factor of 1 √ M in the variance term) without assuming unimodal and symmetric stochastic gradient sampling noise as in [5] . More details can be found in Section 2 of the supplementary document.
Extending to Error-feedback Variant
To further improved the performance of Algorithm 1, we incorporate the error-feedback technique and propose its error-feedback variant, which is presented in Algorithm 2. Remark 7. Note that in Algorithm 2, only the server adopts the error-feedback method. When dp-sign is used, implementing error-feedback on the worker's side may increase the privacy leakage. Accounting for the additional privacy leakage caused by error-feedback is left as future work. 
Algorithm 2 Error-Feedback Stochastic-Sign SGD with majority vote
Input: learning rate η, current hypothesis vector w (t) , current residual error vectorẽ (t) , M workers each with an independent gradient g (t) m = ∇f m (w (t) ), the 1-bit compressor q(·). on server:
m ) +ẽ (t) to all the workers, update residual error:ẽ
on each worker:
Both sto-sign and dp-sign can be used in Algorithm 2 and the corresponding algorithms are termed as EF-Sto-SIGNSGD and EF-DP-SIGNSGD, respectively. In the following, we show the convergence and Byzantine resilience of Algorithm 2 when dp-sign is used. The results can be easily adapted for sto-sign. Particularly, the following theorems can be proved. 
where β is some positive constant.
The proof of Theorem 8 follows the strategy of taking y (t) = w (t) − ηẽ (t) such that y (t) is updated in the same way as w (t) in the non error-feedback scenario. A key technical challenge is to bound the norm of the residual error ||ẽ (t) || 2 2 . Utilizing the fact that the output of the compressor q(·) ∈ {−1, 1}, we upper bound it by first proving that in this case, the server's compressor is an α-approximate compressor [18] for some α < 1.
Besides the fact that error-feedback is only used on the server's side, another difference between Algorithm 2 and those in [18, 19] is that it does not require the workers to share the magnitude information about the gradients. On the one hand, it saves communication overhead. On the other hand, it keeps the resilience against the re-scaling attacks. By following a similar strategy to the proofs of Theorem 8 and considering the impact of Byzantine attackers, we obtain the Byzantine resilience of Algorithm 2 as follows. Theorem 9. At each iteration t, there exists a constant σ 0 such that when σ > σ 0 , Algorithm 2 can at least tolerate k i = | M m=1 ∇f m (w (t) ) i |/σ Byzantine attackers on the i-th coordinate of the gradient. Overall, the number of Byzantine workers that Algorithm 2 can tolerate is given by min 1≤i≤d k i .
Experimental results. For DP-SIGNSGD and EF-DP-SIGNSGD, we follow the idea of gradient clipping in [30] to bound the sensitivity ∆ 2 . After computing the gradient for each individual training sample in the local dataset, each worker clips it in its L 2 norm for a clipping threshold C to ensure that ∆ 2 ≤ C. We set C = 4 in the experiments and the results are shown in Fig. 3 . It can be observed from the first two figures that when there is no Byzantine attackers, EF-DP-SIGNSGD outperforms DP-SIGNSGD for all the examined 's, which demonstrates its effectiveness. In addition, both DP-SIGNSGD and EF-DP-SIGNSGD outperform SIGNSGD, while providing privacy guarantees. Another observation is that the error-feedback variants do not necessarily perform better. For instance, in the second figure of Fig. 3 , when there is one Byzantine attacker and = 1, the testing accuracy of EF-DP-SIGNSGD is worse than that of DP-SIGNSGD. In the beginning of the training process, k i 's in Theorem 9 are large enough such that the algorithm can tolerate the Byzantine attacker. As the gradients decrease, the probability of wrong aggregation increases. In this case, the error-feedback mechanism may carry the wrong aggregations to the future iterations and have a negative impact on the learning process. Similar results are obtained for Sto-SIGNSGD when b = 0.003 in the last figure of Fig. 3 . In the meantime, for b = 0.001 and "Optimal b", the error-feedback variant can tolerate the Byzantine attacker and therefore provide better performance.
Conclusion
We propose a Stochastic-Sign SGD framework which utilizes two novel gradient compressors and can deal with heterogeneous data distribution. The proposed algorithms are proved to converge in the heterogeneous data distribution scenario with the same rate as SIGNSGD in the homogeneous data distribution case. In particular, the proposed differentially private compressor dp-sign improves the privacy and the accuracy simultaneously without sacrificing any communication efficiency. Then, we further improve the learning performance of the proposed method by incorporating the error-feedback scheme. In addition, the Byzantine resilience of the proposed algorithms is shown analytically. It is expected that the proposed algorithms can find wide applications in the design of communication efficient, differentially private and Byzantine resilient FL algorithms.
Supplementary Material
The supplementary material is organized as follows. In Section 1, we formally provide the definition of differential privacy [10] . In section 2, we provide the proofs of the theoretical results presented in the main document. Discussions about the extended differentially private compressor dp-sign when δ = 0 and the server's compressor 1 M sign(·) in Algorithm 2 are provided in Section 3. The details about the implementation of our experiments and some additional experimental results are presented in Section 4.
Definition of Differential Privacy
In this work, we study the privacy guarantee of the proposed algorithms from the lens of differential privacy [10] , which provides a strong notion of individual privacy in data analysis. The definition of differential privacy is formally given as follows. 
A key quantity in characterizing differential privacy for many mechanisms is the sensitivity of the query f in a given norm l r , which is defined as
For more details about the concept of differential privacy, the reader is referred to [10] for a survey. 
where x = bM | M m=1 um| . We first provide some intuition about the proof. Given the majority vote rule, the aggregation result is wrong if more than half of the workers share the wrong signs. In addition, based on the definition of sto-sign, we can obtain the probability of each worker sharing 1 or -1. Therefore, the number of workers that share the wrong signs can be modeled as a Poisson binomial variable, denoted as Z.
The key difficulty is that the correct sign sign( 1 In particular, X m can be considered as the outcome of one Bernoulli trial with successful probability P (X m = 1). Let Z = M m=1 X m and we have
Note that according to the definition of sto-sign, b is large enough such that b > max m |u m |. The probability of X m = 1 is given by
Then, Z follows the Poisson binomial distribution with mean and variance given by
For any variable a > 0, we have
where the last equality is due to the independence among X m 's. In addition, E e aXm = P (X m = 1)e a + P (X m = 0) = 1 + P (X m = 1)(e a − 1) ≤ e P (Xm=1)(e a −1) , (23) where the last inequality is due to the inequality 1 + y ≤ e y .
Combing (22) and (23) 
where we invoke the Markov's inequality.
Since M m=1 um 2b < 0 by our assumption, it can be verified that M 2µ > 1. Let a = ln( M 2µ ) > 0, we have
Let x = bM | M m=1 um| and it can be verified that x > 1 since b > max m |u m |. Then (26) can be reduced to Proof. Since
x is an increasing function of x. In addition, 
The proof of Theorem 2 follows the well known strategy of relating the norm of the gradient to the expected improvement of the global objective in a single iteration. Then accumulating the improvement over the iterations yields the convergence rate of the algorithm.
Proof. According to Assumption 2, we have
where ∇F (w (t) ) i is the i-th entry of the vector ∇F (w (t) ) and η is the learning rate. Taking expectation on both sides yeilds
According to Theorem 1 and Lemma 1, there exists some constant M 0 such that when the number of workers M ≥ M 0 , we have
which means that there exists some positive constant c such that
Plugging (34) into (32), we can obtain
(35)
Adjusting the above inequality and averaging both sides over t = 1, 2, · · · , T , we can obtain
Letting η = 1 √ dT and dividing both sides by η gives
which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3. The proposed compressor dp-sign(·, , δ) is ( , δ)-differentially private for any , δ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. We start from the one-dimension scenario and consider any a, b that satisfy ||a − b|| 2 ≤ ∆ 2 . Without loss of generality, assume that dp-sign(a, , δ) = dp-sign(b, , δ) = 1. Then we have P (dp-sign(a, , δ)
Furthermore, P (dp-sign(a, , δ) = 1) P (dp-sign(b, , δ)
According to Theorem A.1 in [10] , given the parameters , δ and σ, it can be verified that e − ≤ P (dp-sign(a, ,δ)=1) P (dp-sign(b, ,δ)=1) ≤ e with probability at least 1 − δ. For the multi-dimension scenario, consider any vector a and b such that ||a − b|| 2 ≤ ∆ 2 and v ∈ {−1, 1} d , we have P (dp-sign(a, , δ) = v) P (dp-sign(b, , δ) = v)
where D is some integral area depending on v. Similarly, it can be shown that e − ≤ P (dp-sign(a, ,δ)=v) P (dp-sign(b, ,δ)=v) ≤ e with probability at least 1 − δ.
Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4. Let u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u M be M known and fixed real numbers. Further define random variablesû i = dp-sign(u i , , δ), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ M . Then there always exist constants σ 0 and M 0 such that P (sign( 1
The proof of Theorem 4 follows a similar strategy to that of Theorem 1 and Lemma 1. The difficulty we need to overcome is that unlike sto-sign, the expectation of the number of workers that share the wrong signs is not a function of 1
In addition,
Let n denote a zero-mean Gaussian noise with variance σ, according to the assumption that
Therefore,
Note that for any Gaussian noise, P (a 1 < n < 0) + P (a 2 < n < 0) ≥ P (a 1 + a 2 < n < 0) for any a 1 < 0, a 2 < 0. Therefore, we consider the worst case scenario such that K m=1 P (u m < n < 0) − M m=K+1 P (0 < n < u m ) is minimized, i.e., K = 1. In this case,
where the first inequality is due to f (a) > f (u 1 ) for a ∈ (u 1 , − 1 increases and converges to 0. Therefore, we have
As a result, there exists a σ 0 such that when σ ≥ σ 0 , we have
Following the same analysis as that in the proof of Theorem 1 and Lemma 1, we can show that there exists a positive constant M 0 such that when M ≥ M 0
2.6 Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5. Suppose Assumptions 1-2 are satisfied, and set the learning rate η = 1 √ T d . Then there exists some constants σ 0 and M 0 such that when σ ≥ σ 0 and the number of workers M ≥ M 0 , by running DP-SIGNSGD for T iterations, we have
Proof. The proof of Theorem 5 is the same as that of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 6
Theorem 6. There exists a positive constant s 0 such that when s > s 0 , Sto-SIGNSGD and DP-SIGNSGD can at least tolerate k i Byzantine attackers on the i-th coordinate of the gradient and k i satisfies
We first provide some intuition about the proof. It has been shown in the proof of Theorem 2 that the convergence of Sto-SIGNSGD and DP-SIGNSGD is guaranteed if the probability of more than half of the workers sharing wrong signs is less than 0.5. On the i-th coordinate of the gradient, if there are k i Byzantine workers that always share the wrong signs, then at most M −ki 2 normal workers can share wrong signs such that the aggregated result is still correct.
Proof. By replacing M with M − k i in (25), we can obtain
where µ = E[Z]. It is shown in the proof of Theorem 1 and Theorem 4 that there exists a positive 
The mini-batch size of stochastic gradient is at least T .
Proof. Note that in the proof of Theorem 2, we obtain
and
where q(g m ) = dp-sign(g (t) m ) in DP-SIGNSGD.
We first prove the convergence under the first condition. For the ease of notation, let we upper bound it by first proving that in this case, the server's compressor is an α-approximate compressor [18] for some α < 1. Therefore, before proving Theorem 8, we first prove the following lemmas.
Lemma 2. Let y (t) = w (t) − ηMẽ (t) , we have
Proof.
(63)
Given that M (ẽ (t) ) i is even, we can show that M (ẽ (t+1) ) i is even as well. Therefore, M r
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that the first M workers are normal and the last B are Byzantine. Following a similar procedure to the proof of Theorem 8, we can show that
For the first term, we have
For the third term, if B <
Following the same analysis as that in the proof of Theorem 8, the convergence of Algorithm 2 can be established.
3 Discussions about dp-sign with δ = 0 and the server's compressor 1 M sign(·) in Algorithm 2 3.1 dp-sign with δ = 0
In this subsection, we present the differentially private compressor dp-sign with δ = 0. m , the compressor dp-sign outputs dp-sign(g (t) m , , 0). In particular, the i-th entry of dp-sign(g (t) m , , 0) is given by
where λ = ∆1 and ∆ 1 is the sensitivity measures defined in (16) .
Theorem 10. The proposed compressor dp-sign(·, , 0) is ( , 0)-differentially private.
where n ∼ Laplace(0, λ). Similar to the analysis for dp-sign with δ > 0, we can show that . As y (and therefore n and s) increases, a increases and approaches 1 2k+1 . Remark 9. By assuming that the total number of workers is odd, it is guaranteed that there is always a winner in the majority vote. When the number of workers is even, it is possible that r (t) i = 0 and therefore (90) does not hold. This issue can be addressed if the server ignores the communication rounds (e.g., does not transmit anything) during which there is no winner in the majority vote.
Details of the Implementation
Our experiments are mainly implemented using Python 3.7.4 with packages tensorflow 2.0 and numpy 1.16.5. One Intel i7-9700 CPU with 32 GB of memory and one NVIDIA GeForce RTX 2070 SUPER GPU are used in the experiments.
Dataset and Pre-processing
We perform experiments on the standard MNIST dataset for handwritten digit recognition consisting of 60,000 training samples and 10,000 testing samples. 3 Each sample is a 28×28 size gray-level image. We normalize the data by dividing it with the max RGB value (i.e., 255.0).
Dataset Assignment
In our experiments, we consider 31 normal workers and measure the data heterogeneity by the number of labels of data that each worker stores. We first partition the training dataset according to the labels. For each worker, we randomly generate a set of size n which indicates the labels of training data that should be assigned to this worker. Then, a subset of training data from the corresponding labels is randomly sampled and assigned to the worker without replacement. The size of the subset depends on n and the size of the training data for each label. More specifically, we set the size of the subset as 60000/(31n) in the beginning. When there are not enough training data for a label, we reduce the size of the subset accordingly. We consider the scenarios that all the workers have the same number of distinct labels (i.e., the same n for all the workers). For the results in Table 1 , we set n = 1, 2, 4 for "1 LABEL", "2 LABELS", "4 LABELS", respectively. For the rest of the results, we set n = 1.
Neural Network Setting
We implement a two-layer fully connected neural network with softmax of classes with cross-entropy loss. The hidden layer has 128 hidden ReLU units.
Learning Rate Tuning
We use a constant learning rate η and tune the parameters from the set {1, 0.1, 0.01, 0.005, 0.001, 0.0001}. In particular, for Sto-SIGNSGD and EF-Sto-SIGNSGD, we set η = 0.005; for DP-SIGNSGD and EF-DP-SIGNSGD, we set η = 0.01.
Additional Experimental Results
We report some additional experimental results for Sto-SIGNSGD and EF-Sto-SIGNSGD in Fig. 4 We report some additional experimental results for DP-SIGNSGD and EF-DP-SIGNSGD in Fig. 6 . 
